20 research outputs found
Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry
Cost asymmetry is generally thought to hinder collusion because a more efficient firm has both more to gain from a deviation and less to fear from retaliation than less efficient firms. Our paper reexamines this conventional wisdom and characterizes optimal collusion without any prior restriction on the class of strategies. We first stress that firms can credibly agree on retaliation schemes that maximally punish even the most efficient firm. This implies that whenever collusion is sustainable under cost symmetry, some collusion is also sustainable under cost asymmetry; efficient collusion, however, remains more di¢ cult to sustain when costs are asymmetric. Finally, we show that, in the presence of side payments, cost asymmetry generally facilitates collusion.horizontal collusion, cost asymmetry, optimal punishments, side payments
Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry
Cost asymmetry is generally thought to hinder collusion because a more efficient firm has both more to gain from a deviation and less to fear from retaliation than less efficient firms. Our paper reexamines this conventional wisdom and characterizes optimal collusion without any prior restriction on the class of strategies. We first stress that firms can credibly agree on retaliation schemes that maximally punish even the most efficient firm. This implies that whenever collusion is sustainable under cost symmetry, some collusion is also sustainable under cost asymmetry; efficient collusion, however, remains more di¢ cult to sustain when costs are asymmetric. Finally, we show that, in the presence of side payments, cost asymmetry
generally facilitates collusion
Linking Reputations: The Signaling and Feedback Effects of Umbrella Branding
This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of otherwise unrelated products. I show that while umbrella branding can credibly signal
positive quality correlation, there are no equilibria in which umbrella branding either fully reveals high quality, or signals negative quality correlation. Finally, whenever umbrella branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, firms that already produce high quality
products have stronger incentives to invest in developing further high quality products than firms that are currently inactive or produce low quality products
Linking Reputations: The Signaling and Feedback Effects of Umbrella Branding
This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of otherwise unrelated products. I show that while umbrella branding can credibly signal
positive quality correlation, there are no equilibria in which umbrella branding either fully reveals high quality, or signals negative quality correlation. Finally, whenever umbrella branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, firms that already produce high quality
products have stronger incentives to invest in developing further high quality products than firms that are currently inactive or produce low quality products
Linking Reputations through Umbrella Branding
This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of otherwise unrelated products. My analysis predicts that umbrella branding can credibly signal positive correlation between the qualities of the included products to consumers, but cannot certify high quality or signal negative quality correlation. Moreover, whenever umbrella branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, firms that already sell a high (low) quality product have stronger (weaker) incentives to invest in developing another high quality product than new entrants
Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry
Cost asymmetry is generally thought to hinder collusion because a more efficient firm has both more to gain from a deviation and less to fear from retaliation than less efficient firms. Our paper reexamines this conventional wisdom and characterizes optimal collusion without any prior restriction on the class of strategies. We first stress that firms can credibly agree on retaliation schemes that maximally punish even the most efficient firm. This implies that whenever collusion is sustainable under cost symmetry, some collusion is also sustainable under cost asymmetry; efficient collusion, however, remains more di¢ cult to sustain when costs are asymmetric. Finally, we show that, in the presence of side payments, cost asymmetry
generally facilitates collusion